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In this paper we investigate the economic activity of married or cohabiting female immigrants 
in Britain. We distinguish between two immigrant groups: foreign-born females who belong 
to an ethnic minority group and their husbands, and foreign-born white females and their 
husbands. We compare these to native-born white women and their husbands. Our analysis 
deviates from the usual mean analysis and investigates employment, hours worked and 
earnings for males and females, as well as their combined family earnings, along the 
distribution of husbands’ economic potential. We analyse the extent to which economic 
disadvantage may be reinforced at the household level and investigate to what extent it can be 
explained by differences in observable characteristics. We find that white female immigrants 
and their husbands have an overall advantage in earnings over white native born, both 
individually and at the household level. Minority immigrants do less well, in particular at the 
lower end of the husband’s economic potential distribution. This is mainly due to the low 
employment of both genders, which leads to a disadvantage in earnings, intensified at the 
household level. Only part of this differential can be explained by observable characteristics. 
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In Britain, unemployment in 2004 was amongst the lowest in any European country at 4.8 
percent. Furthermore, employment rates (defined as the percentage of those in work over the 
working age) of both males and females were high, at 79 percent and 70 percent, respectively. 
This suggests the labour market is in a healthy state. 
 
These aggregate numbers may however conceal adverse economic circumstances of particular 
groups. In a recent report, Dustmann et al. (2003) (see also Dustmann and  Fabbri, 2005) 
suggest that, for most ethnic minorities and immigrant groups, employment rates and wages 
are significantly  lower than those of white natives. These disadvantages seem particularly 
pronounced for females. Between 1981 and 2000, the unconditional participation of minority 
immigrant  women  remained  below  60%,  whereas  that  of  white  native  women  steadily 
increased from 66% to 76%. Even when conditioning on observable characteristics (such as 
age, number of children, education and region of residence), the probability of black African, 
Pakistani, and Bangladeshi women being out of the labour force is between 15 and 22 percent 
higher than it is for white native women.  
 
In this paper, we further investigate the questions whether and why immigrant groups are 
more disadvantaged than native born whites. Our emphasis is on the female population, and 
we distinguish between white native born females, and white and ethnic minority foreign born 
females. Our analysis deviates from most previous work that analyses the outcomes of males 
and females in isolation, by concentrating on the family context. Analysis at the level of the 
individual may conceal reinforcement of disadvantage at the household level. Analysis of the 
outcomes of different female sub-populations in a family context may help to shed light on 
differences  across  these  groups,  in  particular  when  comparing  groups  that  differ  in  their Gender and Ethnicity 
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origin, ethnicity and cultural background. The downside is that our analysis refers not to the 
whole population, but only to married or co-habiting individuals. 
 
Previous analysis of labour market fortunes of female immigrants in isolation includes papers 
by  Long  (1980),  Funkhouser  and  Trejo  (1988),  Cobb-Clark  (1993),  Schoeni  (1998),  and 
Dustmann and Schmidt (2001). Most of these papers are in the tradition of Chiswick’s (1978) 
seminal study and investigate assimilation of female immigrants, some implementing Borjas’ 
(1985 and 1995) approach to take account of cohort effects. Our work is not the  first to 
analyse immigrant and native born labour market outcomes in a family context. Earlier work 
by Duleep and Sanders (1993) explains patterns of labour force participation of married Asian 
women  as  the outcome  of  a  family  investment strategy.  More  recent  work  by  Baker  and 
Benjamin (1997), Cobb-Clark (2001) and Blau et al. (2003) re-examines this labour supply 
pattern  for  immigrants  for  Canada,  Australia,  and the  US  in  a  household  context, testing 
alternative theories of labour supply behaviour. The importance of analysis of labour supply 
and economic activity at the household level has also been emphasised in a related literature 
on poverty and inequality (see recent work by Gregg and Wadsworth, 2001, and Gregg et al., 
2004). These authors draw attention to the fact that individual level consideration of economic 




Our paper does not aim for a structural interpretation of female labour supply, such as in the 
papers by Baker and Benjamin (1997) and Blau et al. (2003); we leave this for future work. 
Our emphasis is on the differences in labour market outcomes of different immigrant groups, 
compared to native born whites, where we distinguish between white immigrant females and 
immigrant females with an ethnic minority background, with our reference group being white 
                                                 
4 Other reasons to study female behaviour in a household context are disincentives created by social security 
systems. See for example Dilnot and Kell (1987) and Dustmann and Micklewright (1993). Gender and Ethnicity 
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native  born  females.  We  concentrate  on  married  or  cohabitating  couples,  allowing  us  to 
investigate economic disadvantage of particular groups in a family context.
5  We define the 
ethnic group according to the ethnic and immigrant status of the wife.
6  
 
Our  analysis  has  several  goals.  Little  is  known  about  labour  market  activity  of  different 
female groups in general, and in Britain in particular. A first contribution is to establish some 
key  facts  about  the  economic  achievements  of  female  immigrants  belonging  to  different 
groups,  and  compare  them  with  native  born  white  females.  Rather  than  concentrating  on 
means of the distribution, we investigate differences  in outcomes across groups along the 
distribution of the husband’s economic potential. Our measure  for economic potential are 
wages,  where  we  impute  wages  for  husbands  who  do  not  work.  We  also  analyse  the 
correlation between employment outcomes for husbands and wives for each of the groups, 
taking  random  pairing  as  the  benchmark.  Furthermore,  we  investigate  whether  any  group 
disadvantage  with  respect  to  earnings  is  aggravated  or  alleviated  when  we  consider  the 
household context. Finally, we analyse to what extent differences in employment across the 
different  groups  are  explained  by  differences  in  own  characteristics,  and  differences  in 
characteristics of the partner. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data used and the sample and 
provides some descriptive statistics. In section 3 we investigate differences in hourly wages 
and weekly earnings, considering the entire wage distribution of individuals in the minority 
immigrant,  white  immigrant,  and  white  native  groups.  In  section  4,  economic  outcomes 
(namely employment, wages and hours worked) of the three groups are compared along the 
                                                 
5 For  simplicity,  we  will  generally  refer  to  both  groups  as  “married”;  we  refer  to  males  in  the  couple  as 
“husbands” and females as “wives”. 
6 Accordingly,  a  couple  where  for  instance  the  wife  is  belonging  to  an  ethnic  minority  group  and  is  an 
immigrant, and the husband is white UK born would be classified as being in the minority immigrant sample.
   Gender and Ethnicity 
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distribution of the economic potential of the husband. In section 5 and 6 we investigate the 
differentials in employment probabilities and earnings at the household level. In section 7 we 
undertake some simple decompositions to analyse the potential determinants of employment 
differentials. Finally, in section 8, we discuss the results and provide some conclusions. 
2. The Data and the Sample  
 
2.1 The Labour Force Survey 
 
The dataset we use for our analysis is the British Labour Force Survey (LFS). The LFS is a 
household survey, conducted by the Office for National Statistics (ONS). It provides a wide 
range of data on labour market statistics and related topics such as training, qualifications, 
income and disability. The LFS has been carried out in Britain since 1973. Between 1973 and 
1983 it was on a biennial basis, changing into an annual survey from 1983 onwards. The 
sample size is about 60,000 households in each survey, or around 0.5% of the population. 
From  1992  onwards,  the  survey  changed  to  a  rotating  quarterly  panel,  with  the  same 
individuals  being  interviewed  for  five  consecutive  quarters.  Each  quarter  about  59,000 
households  are  interviewed  with  about  138,000  respondents.  The  quarterly  LFS  contains 
information on gross weekly earnings and number of hours worked for the fifth quarter wave 
(1992-1996) or the first and the fifth quarter (1997 onwards).  
 
Our sample covers the period from spring 1992 to the first two months of 2005. We choose 
the starting date 1992 because since that date the LFS has been a quarterly rotating panel with 
information on wages.  
 
We pool the data over the entire period, and take account of time variation in estimation by 
including  year  and  quarter  dummies.  The  main  reason  for  pooling  the  data  is  to  obtain 
sufficient numbers of observations on some of the groups. Immigrants represent about 10% of Gender and Ethnicity 
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the working age population in Britain and minority immigrants represent about 48% of all 
immigrants (LFS 2004). Therefore, the size of the samples of minority and white immigrants 
in a survey which is representative of the entire population (such as the LFS) is fairly small. 
For  example, the total  number  of  observations  available  on  wages of  immigrant  minority 
(married) women is 3930, with about 200 observations yearly from 1993 to 1996 and about 
400 observations afterwards. Similar small sample sizes are available for minority immigrant 
males, with a total of 5422 observations on wages. For white immigrants, sample sizes are 
slightly larger, with 7151 observations for women and 7192 observations for men. The small 
sample size and the type of analysis conducted in the paper also limit the degree of further 
data decomposition (by ethnic group, for example). 
 
2.2 The Sample 
 
We restrict our analysis to individuals who are married or who are cohabiting. We distinguish 
between three groups, where the group definition is defined by the status of the female. In the 
first  group  we  include  couples  where  the  wife  is  foreign  born,  and  belongs  to  an  ethnic 
minority.
7 The second group of our sample consists of couples where the wife is foreign born, 
but white.
8 Minority immigrant women represent 3.8 percent of our sample of women and 
white immigrant women 4.5 percent. The third group of our sample includes couples where 
the  wife  is  born  in  Britain,  and  white.  Notice  that  this  allocation  implies  that  we  assign 
couples according to the wife’s origin; if, for instance, the husband is white British born, and 
the  wife  is  foreign  born,  and  belongs  to  a  minority  group,  the  couple  is  assigned  to  the 
                                                 
7 We define ethnic minority individuals as belonging to the Indian, Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Chinese, Caribbean 
or other smaller ethnic groups. In our sample, 34% of ethnic minority individuals are Indian, the largest ethnic 
group. The second largest minority group are the Pakistanis (14%). Breaking down ethnic minority individuals 
into subgroups may provide further inside, as there are likely to be differences in performance between these 
groups (see Dustmann, Fabbbr and Wadsworth 2003 for some evidence). . We leave this for future work. 
8 About  31%  of  the  white  sample  comes  from  EU  (before  enlargement)  countries,  about  15%  from  Old 
Commonwealth countries (Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa) and about 8% from the United 
States. Gender and Ethnicity 
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minority  foreign  born  sample.  As  our  focus  is  on  females,  this  seems  an  appropriate 
classification.  
 
Table  1  provides  the  number  of  endogamous  marriages  for  women.  We  provide  two 
definitions of endogamous marriage. In the first, we consider couples whose members are 
both from the same ethnic group. In the second, we define endogamous couples as couples 
where both partners are foreign born (in the case of immigrants), or both native born (in the 
case of British born individuals) 
 
Table 1: Same ethnicity couples and same immigrant (or native) status couples 
  Same Ethnicity  Same Immigrant Status 
Minority Immigrants  83%  85% 
White Immigrants  98%  33% 
White Natives  99%  97% 
 
In our sample, 83% of minority immigrant females are married to husbands from the same 
ethnic  group,  and  85%  are  married  to  husbands  who  are  foreign  born.By  contrast,  the 
overwhelming majority of white immigrant females (98%) are married to white men, whereas 
only 33% are married to foreign born husbands. 
 
In  Table  2  we  describe  the  basic  features  of  our  data.  Panel  1  contains  information  for 
immigrant couples from ethnic minority backgrounds, panel 2 for white immigrant couples, 
and panel 3 for white British born couples. The first column of each panel refers to wives, and 
the second column to their husbands. Standard deviations (where applicable) are reported in 
italics underneath the mean of each variable. 
 Gender and Ethnicity 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
  Minority Immigrants  White Immigrants  White Natives 
  Wives  Husbands  Wives  Husbands  Wives  Husbands 
Variables  Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean 






















-  29.04 
14.09 
Degree  11.02  21.64  17.95  28.35  11.16  15.73 
A-levels  16.74  21.97  23.67  32.34  28.31  44.13 
O-levels   43.15  34.31  43.29  28.52  37.83  25.64 
No Qualifications  29.09  22.08  15.09  10.77  22.69  14.50 
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London   45.15  45.18  28.01  27.92  6.16  6.15 
No. Observations  36795  36378  43465  43324  882645  881392 
 
 
The age structure of husbands in the three groups is fairly similar, with white natives being 
slightly older than the two immigrant groups. Wives are between three and four years younger 
than their husbands and this age difference seems to be more pronounced for ethnic minority 
immigrants. 
   
White  immigrant  wives  have  on  average  been  longer  in  Britain  (21  years)  than  ethnic 
minority  immigrant wives (17  years). Immigrant husbands of  minority  immigrant females 
have lived in Britain 3 years longer than their wives. Interestingly, immigrant husbands of 
white immigrant females have lived in Britain for about 15 years, on average, which is about 
6  years  less  than  the  average  for  white  immigrant  women.  Further  decomposition  (not 
reported in the table) shows that the average years since migration (YSM) of white immigrant Gender and Ethnicity 
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females endogamously married is also about 15 years; in contrast, white immigrant women 
exogamously married have lived in Britain on average for 22 years. For minority immigrant 
women, the difference in YSM between those in an endogamous or exogamous marriage is 
only one year. 
 
There are considerable differences in educational attainments. It is notable that native whites 
(both  wives  and  husbands)  leave  full  time  education  the  earliest,  with  nearly  identical 
numbers for husbands and wives (at 16.8 years of age), while white immigrants stay on at 
school for more than 1½ years more. Again, figures for husbands and wives in this group are 
almost the same. Among minority immigrants, there is about a year of difference between 
husbands and wives; nevertheless, husbands of minority women stay on at school longest, and 
minority wives stay on more than one year longer than native born wives. 
 
The figures for the different degrees suggest a slightly different educational distribution than 
the years of full time education. This may be due to difficulties in comparing foreign with 
British  qualifications.
9 With  the  exception  of  minority  females,  the  percentage  of  degree 
holders is higher among all  immigrant groups than among native whites. However, a very 
substantial fraction of minority wives and husbands (29 percent and 22 percent) report leaving 
education  without  any  degree.  This  is  slightly  higher  than  in  the  native  white  population 
where  respective  numbers  are  23  and  14  percent.  The  numbers  are  lowest  for  white 
immigrants, at 15 and 11 percent respectively. Overall, and similar to the age of leaving full 
time education, the largest differences in educational attainments between males and females 
are in the ethnic minority immigrant group. A higher fraction is at the high end of the skill 
                                                 
9 About  22  and  29  percent  of  foreign  born husbands  and wives  do  not  fit  into  any  of  the  standard  British 
education classifications, compared to 14 and 23 percent of native born whites. We classify these individuals 
into the “no qualification” category. This seems roughly appropriate, as their age leaving full time educations is 
similar (15 years for both female groups and 16 and 15 years for minority immigrant and white native males, 
respectively).  Gender and Ethnicity 
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distribution, but, at least for ethnic minority immigrants, a higher fraction is also without any 
school leaving qualification. 
 
We define individuals as employed if they are working at the time of the survey. We define 
individuals as non-employed if they are unemployed or inactive (i.e., out of the labour force). 
We therefore define employment over the total working age population. Earnings for the self-
employed  are  not  reported  in  the  LFS.  We  have  therefore  decided  to  exclude  the  self-
employed from our analysis.  
 
There are differences in employment rates between the groups. Among men, the employment 
rate of husbands of minority immigrant women is lowest, at 72 percent. In contrast, males 
married to native born and to white immigrants have similar employment rates of 84 percent. 
For  females,  differences  are  far  more  dramatic:  among  ethnic  minority  immigrants 
employment  rates  are  only  47  percent,  while  they  are  substantially  higher  among  white 
immigrants and natives (at 64 and 71 percent respectively).  In the employed sample, ethnic 
minority  females  work  the  longest  hours,  on  average  33  hours  a  week,  whereas  white 
immigrant and white native females work 31 and 29 hours, respectively. On the other hand, 
husbands of ethnic minority women work on average 41 hours a week, 2 hours less than 
husbands of white women.  
 
The difference in employment rates can also be seen in the difference in observed weekly 
hours worked for the total sample (where we set hours of individuals out of work to zero). 
Foreign born ethnic minority women work an average of 15 hours, whereas white (immigrant 
and native) women work 20 hours a week. Similarly, their husbands work 30 hours, whereas 
husbands of white (immigrant and native) women work 36 hours. 
 Gender and Ethnicity 
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The survey reports weekly hours of work and gross weekly earnings for those individuals who 
are employed. We construct hourly wages by dividing gross weekly earnings by the total 
amount of hours worked in a week (including overtime). As measures of wages, we use log 
gross hourly wages and log gross weekly earnings. 
 
As we explain above, the LFS is a rotating panel, where individuals are interviewed in five 
waves  in  consecutive  quarters.  Earnings  information  was  collected  only  in  the  last  (fifth) 
wave until 1997, and from then onwards in the first and the last wave. Therefore our data on 
employment status and weekly hours worked is quarterly data, while our wage and earnings 
data is on a yearly basis.  
 
We  impute  wages  for  individuals  who  have  missing  wages  due  to  non-reporting.
10 
Imputations are done separately for each ethnic (minority immigrants, white immigrants and 
white natives) and gender group. Wages are predicted from regressions of the log of deflated
11 
hourly  wages  on  individual  characteristics  (education,  potential  experience  and  potential 
experience squared, dummies for working part-time, region, year and quarter, and, for the 
immigrant samples, years since migration and its square). To our predictions, we add an error 
term, drawn from a normal distribution, whose variance equals the variance of the residuals 
from the regression of those who report earnings. We allow this variance to differ across the 
three groups, and between males and females.
12 We use the same procedure to predict wages 
for individuals who do not work, which we use for computing husband’s economic potential.  
 
                                                 
10 About 22 percent of all earnings observations are missing. The percentage of non-reporting is slightly smaller 
than that in the US Current Population Survey, where in 2001, 31 percent of all public and private sector wages 
were imputed (see Hirsch and Schumacher 2004). Other than for the UK LFS, earnings for those with missing 
values in the US Census or CPS are imputed by the Census, using “hotdeck” procedures. See Lillard et al (1986) 
for details. 
11 As deflator, we use the monthly Retail Price Index. The Retail Price Index is available on the ONS website, 
www.statistics.gov.uk. 
12 This procedure was suggested by Lillard et al. (1986) as an alternative to the „hot deck“ procedure, which 
matches non-respondents with demographically similar donors.  Gender and Ethnicity 
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We eliminate the time trend from our wage information by normalising wages to 2004. We 
report log hourly wages for those who are working and imputed wages for the whole working 
age population in Table 2, for those waves where individuals were interviewed about their 
earnings. Hourly wages (weekly earnings) for those who work include imputations for those 
who have missing values due to non-reporting. Log hourly wages of immigrant women are, 
on average, higher than for native women. In particular, immigrant white women earn 16 
percent more than white native women. Minority immigrant women earn 6 percent more than 
native women. In contrast, husbands married to white immigrant women earn 18 percent more 
than those married to white native women, and husbands of minority immigrant women earn 
8 percent less than husbands of white natives.  
 
Mean  log  hourly  wages  including  individuals  who  are  not  in  employment  are  lower  for 
minority  females  than  for  females  of  the  other  two  groups,  which  reflects  the  lower 
employment rate and stronger selection on observables among minority females who work. 
The larger difference between minority and native women in weekly earnings than in hourly 
wages reflects the fact that minority women who work, work for longer hours than natives. In 
contrast, husbands of minority women earn less than husbands of native women. Husbands of 
white immigrant women earn more than the other two groups.  
 
Ethnic minority women and men have, on average, more dependent children (below age 19) 
than  white  immigrants  and  natives  (1.51  against  0.96  for  immigrants  and  natives, 
respectively), and these differences are quite pronounced in each of the children’s age groups 
that we consider.  
 
 Gender and Ethnicity 
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The  strong  concentration  of  immigrants  in  the  Greater  London  area  is  noteworthy,  in 
particular that of ethnic minority immigrants. While only around 6 percent of the native born 
white couples live in Greater London, nearly 28 percent of the white immigrants, and nearly 
45 percent of the ethnic minority immigrants do so. 
 
3. Wages and Weekly Earnings 
 
We proceed to inspect differences in wages and weekly earnings between minority and white 
immigrants on the one hand, and native born whites on the other. The simple means we have 
displayed in the tables above may give insufficient evidence of the differences in economic 
conditions between the different groups. Rather than concentrating on means, we consider the 
entire distribution of individuals in particular groups. A good summary of the individual’s 
economic  potential  is  the  wage,  and  we  rank  individuals  in  each  of  these  groups, 
distinguishing  between  husbands  and  wives,  according  to their  position  in  the  group  and 
gender  specific  wage  distribution,  splitting  the  overall  distribution  into  deciles.  To  avoid 
distortion of this measure, we need to take account of the fact that we observe individuals at 
different  stages  of  their  labour  market  career.  To  determine  the  individual’s  percentile 
position, we therefore follow Juhn and Murphy (1997) and rank individuals for each year of 
potential experience based on their percentile position in the hourly wage distribution.
13 This 
maps and compares the advantage and disadvantage of the two immigrant groups across the 
group specific distributions of economic potential.  
 
Figures 1 and 2 report results for log hourly wages (including only individuals who work and 
imputing wages for missing wage observations due to non-response) for husbands and wives 
respectively, where the left panel compares minority immigrants and the white native born, 
and the right panel white immigrants and the white native born. Figure 1 suggests different 
                                                 
13 As mentioned before, we also normalise wages and earnings to eliminate time trend. Gender and Ethnicity 
  15 
patterns for the two groups of husbands. The difference in log wages between husbands of 
white natives and husbands of minority immigrants in the bottom deciles is about 0.27, which 
translates into a 31 percent wage difference. This difference diminishes over the decile rank, 
and turns into an advantage from the 8
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Figure 1: Log hourly wage differentials, husbands  
 
Comparing native born white immigrants with white immigrants provides a different picture. 
The mean wage advantage of 18 percent, which we report in Table 2, is mainly driven by 
wage advantages in the upper part of the distribution. In comparison to white native born, 
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Figure 2: Log hourly wage differentials, wives 
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As Figure 2 illustrates, minority immigrant women have a wage advantage over the entire 
range of the wage distribution which is slightly larger in the middle deciles and towards the 
top  end  of the  distribution.  This  advantage, together  with  the  very  low  employment  rate, 
suggests high selection into work of this immigrant group. White immigrant females have 
again an advantage throughout the wage distribution, which is slightly more pronounced in 
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Figure 3: Log weekly earnings differentials, husbands 
 
Figures 3 and 4 display differentials in log weekly earnings. As for wages, we include only 
individuals who work and impute wages for missing wage observations due to non-response.  
The difference in earnings between husbands of minority immigrants and white natives is now 
increasing even further, in particular in the bottom deciles, which is due to husbands of white 
natives working more hours, as compared to husbands of minority immigrants. In the bottom 
decile,  the  difference  in  weekly  earnings  is  around  52  percent.  For  white  immigrants, 
differences remain roughly similar across the distribution to those in log wages. 
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Figure 4: Log weekly earnings differentials, wives 
 
For wives, the wage differential in favour of immigrants increases substantially (especially for 
the minority group) when considering log weekly earnings, in particular at the low end of the 
distribution.  Earnings  differentials  here  are  around  40  percent  in  favour  of  minority 
immigrants.  Unlike  their  husbands,  minority  female  immigrants  who  do  work,  work 
substantially  more  hours  than  native  whites  at the  bottom  parts  of  the  wage  distribution. 
Similarly,  the  positive  differences  in  log  weekly  earnings  increase  for  white  immigrant 
females but resemble roughly the distribution of hourly wage differences, which is due to a 
similar distribution of hours worked. 
 
The  figures  suggest  that  white  immigrant  women  (as  well  as  their  husbands)  are  at  a 
significant advantage regarding their wages and earnings on average, and that this advantage 
is increasing towards the middle and top deciles of the respective distributions.  For minority 
immigrants who work, there seems to be a divide between husbands and wives. Females have 
slightly higher wages, and a large advantage in weekly earnings (due to their higher labour 
supply). In contrast, their husbands are particularly disadvantaged at the bottom end of the 
earnings  distribution,  due  both  to  lower  wages,  as  well  as  lower  working  hours.  This 
disadvantage disappears and turns to an advantage at the top end of the distribution. Gender and Ethnicity 
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4. Comparing outcomes along the male imputed wage distribution 
 
 
In the previous section, we compared wages and earnings considering only those who are in 
work. However, the figures in Table 2 suggest that there are large differences in employment 
between the different groups, in particular for female minority immigrants. Consideration of 
the  total  population  may  change  conclusions  about  economic  advantage.  Furthermore, 
analysis  of  economic  advantage  at the  level  of  the  individual  may  be  misleading.  At the 
household  level,  relative  disadvantage  of  particular  groups  of  individuals  may  well  be 
reinforced, or mitigated, depending on how males and females are paired.  
 
4.1 Matching of wives and husbands  
 
We  commence  by  comparing  women  in  the  different  groups  along  the  distribution  of 
economic potential of their husbands. As a first step, we relate women’s economic potential 
(measured as their observed or imputed wage) along the distribution of husband’s economic 
potential (likewise measured as observed or imputed wage). We do not attempt to control for 
selection  of  those  who  work  when  computing  these  predictions,  which  may  lead  to 
underestimating the economic potential of those who are not in work.  
 
We follow Juhn and Murphy (1997) and use imputed wages for individuals who do not work, 
computed by the imputation method we describe above. For each year of potential experience, 
we then rank individuals according to the husband’s percentile distribution in the (imputed) 
wages in each survey year. We compute the decile differences in the respective distributions 
in  the  various  outcomes  between  the  two  immigrant  groups,  and  white  native  born 
individuals.  Gender and Ethnicity 
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Figure 5: Female imputed wages and employment along the male wage distribution 
 
In Figure 5, we display wages of wives along their husband’s  imputed wage distribution. 
Several  interesting  facts  emerge  from  this  figure.  The  differences  across  the  husband’s 
distribution tend to increase slightly between white immigrant and ethnic minority and native 
women. The figure also suggests that wives with higher wage potential tend to be married to 
husbands with higher wage potential.
14 This sorting is also observed for other countries (see 
for instance Juhn and Murphy, 1997). These patterns are similar across the different groups, 
suggesting that changes in the economic potential of women across the distribution of their 
husband’s potential are comparable across groups.  
 
4.2 Hours worked 
 
In Figures 6 and 7 we display the difference in the number of hours worked per week between 
minority immigrants (left panel) and white immigrants (right panel), and white natives. We 
set  hours  worked  to  zero  for  those  individuals  who  do  not  work.  Again,  we  rank  decile 
differences along the male imputed wage distribution.  
                                                 
14 The same diagram with only working wives who report wages looks almost identical. Gender and Ethnicity 
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Figure 6: Husbands’ weekly hours worked differentials along their imputed wage distributions, total 
population  
 
Figure 6 refers to husbands, and suggests considerable overall differences in weekly hours 
worked at the low end of the imputed wage distribution for those married to minority females, 
relative to those married to white natives. In contrast, total hours worked are very similar 
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Figure 7: Female weekly hours worked differentials along the husbands’ imputed wage distributions, total 
population 
 
Figure 7 refers to wives. Similar to their husbands, there is a considerable disadvantage in 
hours worked for minority females along the whole distribution, which is particularly large at 
the bottom end. Hours worked for white foreign born females and native born females are 
very similar. Gender and Ethnicity 
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Combined  with  our  findings  in  section  3,  these  figures  suggest  that  female  minority 
immigrants who are at the bottom of the wage distribution and who work, compensate for 
their wage disadvantage relative to native born females, by working longer hours. This leads 
to an overall earnings advantage at the lower deciles. However, when considering the entire 
population, the low employment rate of minority immigrant females leads to lower total hours 
worked. Along the distribution of their husband’s economic potential, this disadvantage seems 
to be particularly pronounced at the bottom percentiles. 
4.3 Weekly Earnings 
 
How does this translate into weekly earnings differences? In Table 3 we display percentage 
differences  in  mean  weekly  earnings  across  the  male  wage  distribution  for  wives  and 
husbands where earnings of those who do not work are set to zero. For husbands of female 
minority immigrants, the average difference is 31 percent, implying that on average they earn 
31% less;  however, differentials are very  large  at the bottom end of the distribution, and 
decrease when we move to the top end of the distribution. In the top decile, the difference is 
only  6  percent,  compared  to  77  percent  in  the  first  decile.  For  those  married  to  white 
immigrants, the difference to natives is negative on average (at 16 percent), suggesting an 
overall advantage, in particular at the top end of the distribution. 
 
The first and third columns report figures for females. The disadvantage for female minority 
immigrants remains on average higher and in the husband’s lowest decile is even larger than 
for their  husbands (where white women earn  more than twice as  much as ethnic  minority 
women).  The  disadvantage  is  most  pronounced  in  the  bottom  deciles  of  the  husband’s 
economic potential. Comparing native born wives to white immigrants, the differentials are 
overall in favour of immigrants, with stronger advantage in the middle of the distribution.  Gender and Ethnicity 
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Table 3: Percentage Differential in Weekly Earnings (Total Population) 
  Minority immigrants  White immigrants 
Deciles  Wives  Husbands  Wives  Husbands 
         
1  117.59  76.56  -6.96   -6.52     
2  81.13  63.79  -6.82   -10.15     
3   61.66   43.66  -9.90   -10.13    
4   38.62   38.54  -18.89  -14.09    
5   24.33   30.95  -18.57  -16.73    
6   37.20   23.56  -19.38  -17.96    
7   26.75   16.33  -17.84  -19.36    
8   10.13   23.12  -12.92  -19.76 
9   7.77   13.24  -10.39  -21.91    
10   2.16   6.16  -3.80  -25.28     
Average over total 
sample 
43.60  31.35  -12.55  -16.19 
 
  
For robustness, we replicated our descriptive analysis in sections 3 and 4 on the sub-samples 
of same ethnicity couples and same immigrant status only. In the first case, results are very 
similar to those deriving from the total sample. In the second case, we find that couples in 
endogamous  relationships  perform  worse  than  couples  in  exogamous  relationships.  This 
evidence is stronger for white immigrant couples. In particular, with respect to white natives, 
wage and earnings disadvantages for ethnic minority couples are slightly higher than those 
found in the main analysis. In contrast, wage and earnings advantages for white immigrant 
couples are lower. This evidence suggests that there is a potential premium for intermarried 
immigrants.  Study  of  intermarriage  premium,  however,  involves  the  complicated  task  of 
disentangling its selection and productivity components
15. This kind of analysis is beyond the 
scope of this paper and will be addressed in future research. 
 
5. Employment and Non-Employment Concentration at the Household Level 
 
One result that stands out from Figures 6 and 7 is the considerable difference in employment 
rates across the different groups, with ethnic minority immigrants (and in particular females) 
                                                 
15 See Meng and Gregory (2005) and Kantarevic (2004) for a thorough discussion on the issue. Gender and Ethnicity 
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having much lower employment rates than individuals in the other groups. In this section we 
investigate whether these differences are reinforced at the household level.  
 
5.1 Measuring Polarisation 
 
We commence by reporting some statistics of the distribution of employment at household 
level for the three groups we consider.  
 
Table 4: Probability of being in Employment and Polarization (h=husband, w=wife) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 






71.74  46.79  55.85  40.06  33.57  6.49  19.33 
White 
Immigrant  
84.14  64.39  69.18  58.21  54.18  4.03  7.43 
White 
Native  
83.89  71.34  77.33  64.87  59.84  5.03  8.40 
 
 
In the first two columns of Table 4 we report the probabilities of husbands and wives being 
employed.  These  numbers  reiterate  those  in  Table  2,  and  show  large  differences  in 
employment, in particular between minority immigrants and the other two groups. Column 3 
reports the conditional probability of the wife being in employment, given that the husband is 
in work. If employment events within households were independent, this probability should 
be equal to the marginal probability in column 2. The numbers suggest that conditional on the 
husband working, the probabilities of minority immigrant, white immigrant, and white native 
born women being employed increase by 9, 5 and 6 percentage points respectively, or by 19, 
7.4, and 8.4 percent.  
 
In columns 4 and 5 we report the joint probability of the household being in work, and the 
product of the marginal probabilities respectively. If the events of the husband and the wife 
being  employed  were  independent,  then ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 , 1 ( = = = = = w P h P w h P .  The  difference Gender and Ethnicity 
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between  the  actual  probability  of  employment  at  the  household  level,  and  the  predicted 
probability, ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 , 1 ( = = - = = w P h P w h P , is called polarisation by Gregg and Wadsworth 
(2004)  and  Gregg  et  al.  (2004)
16 and  is  reported  in  column  6.  If  work  was  randomly 
distributed  across  individuals,  independent  of  their  household  formation,  then  this  index 
would equal zero. The  index  is higher  for ethnic minority  immigrant households than  for 
white native born households. Note that, as this index is sensitive to the size of the smallest 
marginal probability,
17 it may be misleading when comparing different groups. In column 7 
we report the percent difference between the joint probability and the product of the marginal 
probabilities  of  employment,  which  is  largest  for  minority  individuals.
18 These  numbers 
reiterate findings in previous sections that both minority immigrant wives and their husbands 
have lower employment probabilities than wives and husbands in the other two groups. They 
suggest in addition, that there is a stronger polarisation of working males and females in the 
same households for the minority group. 
 
5.2 Employment probabilities along husband’s economic potential 
 
In Figure 8 we display the marginal probabilities of employment of husbands and wives for 
the  three  groups  along  the  husbands’  imputed  wage  distribution.  For  females,  the  figure 
suggests  fairly  stable  employment  probabilities  for  the  two  white  groups  across  the 
distribution. For minority immigrant women, employment probabilities at the bottom deciles 
are about 30 percent, but increase to between 50 and 60 percent at the top deciles. Husbands 
of female minority immigrants show a similar increase, starting at about 60 percent at the 
bottom decile and rising to over 80 percent at the top decile.    
                                                 
16 They compute ) 0 ( ) 0 ( ) 0 , 0 ( = = - = = w P h P w h P , which is equal to  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 , 1 ( = = - = = w P h P w h P .  
17 This is as both   ) 1 , 1 ( = = w h P  and  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( = = w P h P  must be smaller than  )} 1 ( ), 1 ( min{ = = w P h P .  
18 Alternatively, this index can be written as 100*(P(w=1|h=1)-P(w=1))/P(w=1), the percent difference between 
the conditional and unconditional employment probability of the wife. Gender and Ethnicity 
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Figure 8: Wives and husbands’ employment probabilities along husbands’ imputed wage distribution 
 
Figure 9 displays joint probabilities of both partners working ( ) 1 , 1 ( = = w h P , left panel) and 
both partners not working ( ) 0 , 0 ( = = w h P , right panel) along the deciles of the male imputed 
wage distributions. As before, the figure shows large differences between groups. For white 
natives  and  white  immigrants,  the  probability  of  both  partners  working  seems  to  have  a 
slightly concave shape. It is lowest on the 1
st and 10
th deciles and highest in the middle of the 
distribution. On the other hand, for minority immigrants, it increases along the distribution, 
with the probability of both partners working growing from 20 percent in the bottom decile of 
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Figure 9 Household Full-Employment and Non-Employment probabilities along the male wage 
distribution 
 Gender and Ethnicity 
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In  the  right  panel,  we  display  the  joint  probabilities  of  joblessness.  Similarly,  this  figure 
shows that the probability of joblessness decreases slightly for couples with white immigrant 
or  native  born  white  females  over  the  interdecile  range  of  the  husband’s  imputed  wage 
distribution and ranges between 14 and 8 percent. For minority immigrants, it decreases from 
around 32 percent in the bottom deciles to around 10 percent in the top deciles. 
 
These figures suggest that households where both partners are employed and both partners are 
non-employed,  seem  to  be  fairly  equally  distributed  along  the  distribution  of  husband’s 
economic  potential  for  households  with  white  native  born  and  immigrant  women.  For 
households with minority wives, the joint probability that both partners are in employment is 
lower at the lower parts of the husband’s imputed wage distribution. This is due to individual 
employment probabilities of males and their female partners both being lower for males with 
low economic potential, as suggested by Figure 8. It may be re-enforced by a lower degree of 
sorting of employed females and males at lower deciles of the husband’s economic potential. 
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Figure 10: Polarisation along male wage distribution 
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In Figure 10 we display the difference in the joint probability and the product of the marginal 
probabilities of husband’s and wife’s employment (Gregg and Wadsworth’s “polarisation” 
index)  for the three  groups. The  counterfactual  in  each  decile  of  the  wage  distribution  is 
computed as the product of the marginal probabilities 
D D w P h P ) 1 ( ) 1 ( = = , where D is the 
respective decile. The figure reiterates the results in Table 4, that polarisation is on average 
slightly higher for minority immigrant couples than for white native and white immigrant 
couples. Furthermore, while polarisation seems to steadily decrease for white couples, it has 
an  inverse  U-shape  for  minority  couples.  It  increases  until  about  the  median,  and  then 
decreases,  first  re-enforcing  and  then  counteracting  the  slope  of  the  joint  household  full-
employment probabilities, as compared to those obtained by random matching.  
 
6. Family Earnings across the distribution of husbands’ economic potential 
 
The results in the previous sections suggest that males and females from the ethnic minority 
population are disadvantaged with respect to their wages relative to individuals from the white 
majority population. They also indicate relatively low individual and household employment 
rates at the bottom ranges of the distribution of the husband’s economic potential for minority 
males and females. All this suggests that earnings disadvantages in the minority population in 
the lower deciles of the overall distribution, are aggravated at the household level.  
 
To  investigate  this,  we  display  in  Figure  11  the  differences  in  family  log  gross  weekly 
earnings. In Figure 12 we display differences  in gross weekly  earnings where we  include 
couples where both are out of employment, and we set weekly earnings at zero. In Table 5 we 
report the percentage differences along the distribution of husband’s economic potential for 
this last group.  Gender and Ethnicity 
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Figure 11: Family log weekly earnings differentials along the male group wage distributions 
 
Consider first Figure 11, where we only include couples where at least one partner is in work. 
For ethnic minority couples, the earnings differential at the lower end of the distribution is 
larger than at other points of the distribution. In the bottom decile, white native households 
earn, on average, 68 percent more than minority households. This differential decreases to 28 
percent in the third decile and turns to an advantage only in the top decile.  
 
For  white  immigrant  families,  the  differential  is  negative,  with  white  immigrant  families 
earning more than native families throughout the distribution, and in particular between the 
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Figure 12: Family weekly earnings differentials along the male group wage distributions (total population) 
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Figure  12  includes  non-working  households  and  reports  actual  differences  without  the 
logarithmic transformation. Earnings differentials for minority couples vary between 44 and 
168 pounds. The average differential between minority and white native families in the first 
decile is of 158 pounds per week. In percentage terms (reported in Table 5), this differential is 
large. Average family earnings for minorities in the first decile amount to a mere 173 pounds 
per  week,  against  330  pounds  per  week  for  white  natives.  This  means  that  white  native 
families in the first decile of husband’s distribution of economic potential earn almost twice 
as much as minority families. In contrast, the earnings difference in the tenth decile is 44 
pounds, which, in relative terms, translates into a 4 percent difference between native and 
minority earnings.  
 
For  white  immigrants,  differentials  in  the  middle  deciles  are  substantially  in  favour  of 
immigrants. In percentages terms, these differentials are highest between the middle and top 
end of the distribution. 
 
Table 5: Percentage Differential in Family Weekly Earnings (Total Population) 
 
Decile  Minority immigrants  White immigrants 
     
1  90.70  -6.63 
2  68.79  -9.12 
3  49.36  -10.22 
4  38.48  -15.63 
5  28.69  -17.33 
6  27.78  -18.62 
7  19.63  -19.13 
8  11.81  -18.04 
9  11.17  -19.03 
10  4.15  -21.57 
Average over total 
sample 
35.06  -15.53 
 
 
7. What explains employment differences between groups?  
 
In  the  previous  sections  we  have  illustrated  considerable  differences  in  employment,  in 
particular between minority immigrants and white natives. These differences contribute to the Gender and Ethnicity 
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sizeable disadvantage in earnings of couples where the wife belongs to an ethnic minority, in 
particular at the lower deciles of the distribution of husband’s economic potential. In this 
section  we  investigate  the  possible  reasons  for  these  differences  in  terms  of  observed 
characteristics.  
 
Our analysis relies on standard Oaxaca decompositions for employment probabilities, where 
the estimation is based on linear probability models. Regressions use two specifications: one 
using a set of individual characteristics (such as education, age, and number of children), and 
a second adding partner’s characteristics, including educational achievements and age. The 
interpretation of our estimates and decomposition is non-causal. As before, we investigate 
employment decompositions along the husband’s wage potential. The full specifications with 
estimated  coefficients  and  decompositions  for  the  overall  samples  are  reported  in  the 
Appendix. 
 
As we saw in Table 2, there are both similarities and differences in observed characteristics 
between the immigrant groups and native whites. One particularly distinguishing feature of 
minority immigrants was the larger number of children in each of the age categories. This 
may have an important effect on labour supply behaviour. The estimated coefficients in Table 
6 in the Appendix show evidence of a slightly smaller response to the presence of children in 
the age groups between 0 and 9 years in the sample of minority females. On the other hand, 
there seems to be a slightly stronger response from minority females to having a degree or A-
levels, compared to the other groups. The second set of columns in Table 6 includes partner 
characteristics.  For  all  groups,  having  a  partner  with  a  degree  increases  employment 
probabilities,  while  employment  probabilities  of  minority  and  white  native  women  are 
increase with partner’s age at a decreasing rate. 
 Gender and Ethnicity 
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Figure  13 to  16 report  both  the  raw  employment  differential  and  the  “explained”  part of 
wives’  and  husbands’  employment  differentials  along  the  husband’s  imputed  wage 
distribution. The white native group is taken as the norm for the decompositions. 
 
Figure  13  partly  reiterates  the  findings  from  Figure  8  (left  panel).  The  employment 
differential  between  minority  and  white  native  wives  is  higher  in  the  lower  part  of  the 
husband’s wage distribution. Figure 13 shows that the fraction of this differential that can be 
explained by individual and partner’s characteristics decreases along the distribution, but is 
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Figure 13: Oaxaca employment decompositions, minority immigrant wives. The left panel reports results 
unconditional on partner’s characteristics, the right panel conditional on partner’s characteristics. 
 
Figure 14 reports differentials between white immigrants’ wives and white natives’ wives. It 
shows  that  the  employment  disadvantage  is  higher  for  wives  whose  husbands  are  in  the 
highest deciles. The overall differentials are however much lower than for minority wives and 
their husbands. Hardly any of the differential can be explained by individual and partner’s 
characteristics. 
 Gender and Ethnicity 














1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Percentiles Husband’s Wage Distribution
White Immigrant Wives
Employment Decompositions















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Percentiles Husband’s Wage Distribution
White Immigrant Wives
Employment Decompositions
Raw Differential Explained part
 
Figure 14: Oaxaca employment decompositions, white immigrant wives. The left panel reports results 
without partner’s characteristics, the right panel with partner’s characteristics. 
 
 
For husbands of minority immigrant women (Figure 15), a larger part of the unemployment 
differential  is  explained  by  individual  and  partner’s  characteristics,  but  the  explained 
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Figure 15: Oaxaca employment decompositions, husbands of minority immigrant wives. The left panel 
reports results unconditional on partner’s characteristics, the right panel conditional on partner’s 
characteristics. 
 
Figure 16 reports results for husbands of white immigrant women. Here the numbers seem to 
suggest that according to their observed characteristics, and relative to husbands of white 
native women, the employment rate of husbands of white immigrant women should be higher 
in most deciles. However, the overall differences are very small. 
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Figure 16: Oaxaca employment decompositions, husbands of white immigrant wives. The left panel 
reports results without partner’s characteristics, the right panel with partner’s characteristics. 
 
 
8. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
In this paper we present a detailed analysis of immigrant women in Britain in a household 
context.  We  distinguish  between  immigrant  women  who  belong  to  ethnic  minority 
communities, and white immigrant women. We consider married or cohabitating couples, and 
analyse both women and their husbands. Much of our analysis compares these groups along 
the husband’s distribution of economic potential. 
 
We find large differences between the two immigrant groups, relative to husbands and wives 
in  couples  where  the  woman  is  white  British  born.  Couples  where  the  wife  is  a  white 
immigrant have labour supply patterns similar to couples where the wife is white and native 
born. However, white female immigrants have higher wages and weekly earnings than white 
native born women. Their husbands are likewise more successful on average, and increasingly 
so when moving up the distribution of their economic potential. 
 
In  contrast,  results  for  ethnic  minority  couples  reveal  a  more  complex  scenario.  Average 
wages  of  ethnic  minority  females  are  slightly  higher  than  those  of  white  natives.  Due to Gender and Ethnicity 
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higher labour supply, their weekly earnings are even higher. However, the employment rate of 
ethnic minority foreign born women is much lower than for white natives. This leads to a 
large  economic  disadvantage  for  the  total  ethnic  minority  female  population.  The 
disadvantage is particularly pronounced at the bottom of the distribution of the husbands’ 
economic potential. Husbands of ethnic minority women, in addition, have both wage and 
earnings  disadvantages  at  the  lower  end  of  their  economic  potential.  Labour  supply  and 
employment rates are also lower than for husbands of white native women, again particularly 
at the lower end of their wage distribution. 
 
There is evidence of sorting of females along the economic potential of males for all groups. 
Employment probabilities for both white immigrant and white native women do not greatly 
differ along this distribution, while those of minority immigrants are much lower on average. 
This is in contrast to findings regarding Asian immigrant women in the US (see Duleep and 
Sanders 1993), which may be due to the different composition of Asian immigrants between 
the  US  and  the  UK.  When  investigating  employment  patterns  along  the  distribution  of 
husband’s  economic  potential,  we  find  very  low  employment  at  the  bottom  deciles,  and 
convergence to those of white immigrants at the top deciles. This translates into a serious 
disadvantage for minority immigrant couples in terms of weekly earnings, in particular at the 
bottom of the distribution of the husband’s economic potential. In contrast, immigrant couples 
with  a  white  wife,  have  on  average,  an  advantage  in  terms  of  weekly  earnings,  when 
compared to natives. 
 
Our analysis is a first exploration of the economic activity of different immigrant groups in 
Britain in a household context. It demonstrates substantial differences among groups in the 
immigrant  population,  and  large  differences  within  these  groups  along  the  distribution  of 
husband’s economic potential. We have not attempted to estimate structural models and we Gender and Ethnicity 
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have been parsimonious when dealing with particularities in our data. Future work should 
explore additional important issues which we could not address in this paper. For instance, 
while we demonstrate large employment differentials for both males and females between the 
groups of ethnic minority immigrant wives and white native born wives, we are unable to 
explain  these  differences  in  terms  of  observed  characteristics.  We  also  aggregate  various 
ethnic groups; we know from other sources (for instance Dustmann, Fabbri and Wadsworth 
2003) that there are differences in performance between the different non-white groups. A 
further breakdown of ethnic minority individuals into different ethnic groups could provide 
further  interesting  insights.  We  have  also  shown that  a  fraction  of  immigrant  women  are 
married  or  cohabiting  with  men  outside  their  ethnic  groups.  Recent  work  by  Meng  and 
Gregory  (2005)  find  large  earnings  advantages  for  those  immigrants  who  are  married  to 
natives. Extension of this analysis to the British case, and considering differences in ethnic 
origin, may contribute to drawing a more complete picture of economic differences across the 
various groups.  
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Table 6: Employment regressions used in the Oaxaca decomposition, wives 
  Minority Immigrants  White Immigrants  White Natives 
O level  0.158  0.131  0.129  0.125  0.163  0.154 
  [26.92]**  [20.20]**  [19.45]**  [17.56]**  [131.36]**  [121.48]** 
A level  0.375  0.334  0.234  0.221  0.203  0.196 
  [50.83]**  [41.90]**  [32.42]**  [28.54]**  [153.95]**  [142.49]** 
Degree  0.360  0.331  0.255  0.250  0.251  0.261 
  [41.69]**  [33.45]**  [32.69]**  [28.33]**  [145.78]**  [134.86]** 
Age  0.063  0.053  0.033  0.033  0.049  0.042 
  [28.41]**  [20.03]**  [16.67]**  [13.15]**  [124.01]**  [74.11]** 
Age squared 
/100 
-0.078  -0.063  -0.047  -0.044  -0.069  -0.056 
  [28.23]**  [19.10]**  [19.31]**  [14.09]**  [142.23]**  [82.36]** 
Children aged 
0 to 4 
-0.162  -0.162  -0.223  -0.222  -0.211  -0.212 
  [41.14]**  [41.33]**  [57.06]**  [56.96]**  [235.95]**  [236.97]** 
Children aged 
5 to 9 
-0.086  -0.086  -0.118  -0.116  -0.101  -0.101 
  [24.27]**  [24.37]**  [29.58]**  [29.21]**  [120.45]**  [121.47]** 
Children aged 
10 to 18 
-0.044  -0.043  -0.038  -0.037  -0.042  -0.042 
  [16.02]**  [15.49]**  [11.79]**  [11.57]**  [62.49]**  [63.27]** 
Partner’s O 
level 
  0.038    -0.018    0.052 
    [5.42]**    [2.23]*    [33.82]** 
Partner’s A 
level 
  0.127    0.066    0.058 
    [16.26]**    [8.07]**    [41.15]** 
Partner’s 
Degree 
  0.044    0.006    0.006 
    [5.12]**    [0.63]    [3.16]** 
Partner’s age    0.014    -0.001    0.010 
    [5.90]**    [0.25]    [18.70]** 
Partner’s age 
sq./100 
  -0.019    -0.004    -0.015 
    [7.03]**    [1.40]    [25.51]** 
Constant  -0.875  -0.994  0.094  0.092  -0.158  -0.248 
  [16.92]**  [17.55]**  [2.11]*  [1.94]  [18.93]**  [27.83]** 
Observations  36791  36791  43464  43464  882626  882626 
R-squared  0.20  0.21  0.13  0.14  0.13  0.14 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
       
Table 7: Employment differential decompositions, wives 
  Minority Immigrants  White Immigrants 









differential  0.245  0.245  0.069  0.069 
unexplained  0.194  0.172  0.062  0.056 
% unexplained  79.1  70.2  89.0  80.9 
explained  0.051  0.073  0.008  0.013 
% explained  20.9  29.8  11.0  19.1 Gender and Ethnicity 
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Table 8: Employment regressions used in the Oaxaca decomposition, husbands 
  Minority Immigrants  White Immigrants  White Natives 
O level  0.125  0.095  0.164  0.119  0.145  0.124 
  [11.61]**  [8.11]**  [15.33]**  [10.52]**  [66.84]**  [56.65]** 
A level  0.236  0.195  0.196  0.145  0.168  0.142 
  [19.87]**  [15.05]**  [18.58]**  [12.89]**  [84.06]**  [69.43]** 
Degree  0.275  0.227  0.231  0.167  0.201  0.163 
  [22.94]**  [16.24]**  [21.59]**  [13.82]**  [84.37]**  [61.88]** 
Age  0.056  0.046  0.043  0.035  0.050  0.040 
  [16.54]**  [11.52]**  [17.83]**  [11.09]**  [95.02]**  [52.58]** 
Age squared 
/100 
-0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.000  -0.001  -0.001 
  [19.43]**  [14.32]**  [20.64]**  [13.80]**  [111.33]**  [66.32]** 
Children aged 
0 to 4 
-0.055  -0.046  -0.021  -0.020  -0.032  -0.031 
  [8.76]**  [6.99]**  [4.10]**  [3.89]**  [25.51]**  [24.19]** 
Children aged 
5 to 9 
-0.038  -0.036  -0.034  -0.034  -0.035  -0.036 
  [6.73]**  [6.18]**  [6.31]**  [6.39]**  [30.00]**  [30.55]** 
Children aged 
10 to 18 
-0.028  -0.028  -0.008  -0.010  -0.023  -0.026 
  [6.30]**  [6.23]**  [1.79]  [2.35]*  [24.89]**  [27.57]** 
Partner’s O 
level 
  0.058    0.104    0.082 
    [5.40]**    [10.77]**    [44.77]** 
Partner’s A 
level 
  0.101    0.124    0.093 
    [7.71]**    [11.68]**    [47.08]** 
Partner’s 
Degree 
  0.069    0.118    0.084 
    [4.32]**    [9.98]**    [31.07]** 
Partner’s age    0.016    0.012    0.015 
    [3.60]**    [3.48]**    [18.90]** 
Partner’s age 
sq./100 
  -0.016    -0.013    -0.016 
    [3.02]**    [3.01]**    [16.83]** 
Constant  -0.562  -0.678  -0.149  -0.256  -0.188  -0.305 
  [6.52]**  [7.32]**  [2.50]*  [3.99]**  [15.45]**  [23.72]** 
Observations  11744  11744  13830  13830  277724  277724 
R-squared  0.15  0.16  0.13  0.14  0.14  0.15 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
       
Table 9: Employment differential decompositions, husbands 
  Minority Immigrants  White Immigrants 









differential  0.121  0.121  -0.003  -0.003 
unexplained  0.080  0.072  0.011  0.014 
% unexplained  65.5  59.4  -418.4  -528.9 
explained  0.042  0.049  -0.013  -0.016 
% explained  34.5  40.6  518.4  628.9 
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